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NOTE
Employment Law: Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act vs. Employee Seniority
Rights: Understanding the Real Conflict in U.S. Airways v.
Barnett
L Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990' (ADA) has been the center of
controversy in several recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions.2 Justice O'Connor
aptly described the Supreme Court's October 2001 term as one that would be
remembered for its "emphasis on the ADA."3 One of these landmark cases, U.S.
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,4 is tremendously important because the Supreme Court
interpreted the meaning of "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA for the
first time.5 More importantly, the Supreme Court sought to resolve the conflict
between reasonable accommodation under the ADA and employers' bona fide
seniority systems and the seniority rights of nondisabled employees.6
In a fascinating 5-4 decision, the Court held that employers ordinarily need
not reassign disabled employees as a reasonable accommodation of their
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. Several recent Supreme Court cases interpret various ADA provisions. See Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (holding that "punitive damages... may not be awarded in
suits brought under § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act"); Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78-79 (2002) (allowing employers to screen out potential
workers with a disability for on-the-job risks to their own health or safety); EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288 (2002) (interpreting the relationship between an agreement to
arbitrate an employment dispute and the EEOC's pursuit of relief under an ADA enforcement
action); Toyota MotorMfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (identifying correct standard
for what constitutes a disability under the ADA); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661,676-
78 (2001) (interpreting the public accommodation provision of Title I of the ADA in regard
to a professional golfer); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,363-65 (2001)
(determining the scope of the Eleventh Amendment regarding state employee suits under Title
I of the ADA).
3. Tony Mauro, American Lawyer Media: Supremes Continue to Trim ADA's Parameters,
THE RECORDER (S.F.), April 30, 2002, at 2.
4. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
5. See Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Reasonable Accommodation Under the
ADA, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 361, 362 (2002) ("Barnett is important because it is the first decision
by the Court to construe the heart of the employment sections of the ADA-the requirement that
an employer must make 'reasonable accommodations' to the needs of a disabled employee....
Barnett is the first high court word on what 'reasonable accommodation' means.").
6. Id.
225
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disability if this reassignment will conflict with the employers' seniority
systems.7 The Court, however, failed to follow a bright-line approach in
honoring the importance of employee seniority rights. On its own initiative, the
Court created an opportunity for employees to combat the effectiveness of
employers' seniority systems, allowing employees to rebut the reasonableness
of a seniority system by showing past inconsistencies in the system's
administration.8 Because of these past inconsistencies, the Court reasoned,
employees will lack the essential element of reliance on the consistent and
nondiscriminatory execution of seniority rights within the company.9 Thus, the
Court concluded, making one more accommodation will have little adverse
effect on either the nondisabled employees or their employers.'0
The unlikely majority of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer traveled a middle course between the two
approaches proposed by the two polar dissenting opinions. Justice Souter,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed with the plaintiff employee, arguing that it
is not unreasonable to accommodate individuals by placing them in a position
that conflicts with seniority." In contrast, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, agreed with the defendant, U.S. Airways, promoting the bright-line
approach that it should always be unreasonable to assign disabled employees to
a position that conflicts with any employer's bona fide seniority policy."
The Court's comprised ruling ignores established precedent supporting and
upholding bona fide seniority systems and their tremendous role in the
employment community.' 3 In so doing, the Court's decision will effectively
eliminate the ability of employers with bona fide seniority systems to prevail on
summary judgment because of the newly created rebuttable presumption
allowing employees to challenge the validity and consistency of seniority
systems. As such, Barnett will substantially increase ADA litigation, allowing
it to survive long past the summary judgment phase, as well as cause a lack of
uniformity among courts interpreting when and how employers' seniority
systems can meet the consistency standards set forth by the Court. In essence,
by creating this judicial scapegoat for employees because of its fear of
unilaterally created seniority systems, the Court in its new balancing approach
provides unwarranted preferential treatment to disabled employees under the
ADA.
7. U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 403.
8. Id. at 405.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 420 (Souter, J., dissenting).
12. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. See discussion infra Part U.A.
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This note explores and analyzes the Court's opinion in Barnett, the prior
precedent, the immediate impact of Barnett on ADA interpretation and on
subsequent ADA cases, and the policy ramifications of the Court's misguided
conclusion. Part 11 of this note discusses the ADA's reasonable accommodation
provision, the value of seniority systems in the employment setting, and then
examines the history of the battle between "reasonable accommodation" and
bona fide seniority systems under the ADA. Part III outlines the Bamett Court's
holding and analyzes both dissenting opinions. In Part IV, this note critiques the
Court's faulty balancing approach, the policy implications of the Court's ruling,
and why Justice Souter's dissent does not offer a workable solution. Finally,
Part V concludes by suggesting the following bright-line approach for the Court:
it should always be unreasonable to accommodate disabled employees under the
ADA if that accommodation conflicts with legal and bona fide seniority systems,
regardless of whether employers have unilaterally created and administered the
seniority system.
II. Historical Background
A. Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA
Under the ADA, employers are prohibited from discriminating against "a
qualified individual with a disability."' 4  The ADA defines a "qualified
individual" as an employee who, "with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires."'" Thus, employers discriminate if they do not make
"reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability."' 6 Accordingly, employers owe
no duty to accommodate disabled employees who require an unreasonable
accommodation to perform their jobs. In addition, employers' actions do not
constitute discrimination if employers can show that the accommodation "would
impose an undue hardship" on the operation of their business. 7 Typical
examples of reasonable accommodations given by the ADA include: (1)
"[miaking changes to existing facilities,"' 8 (2) "[p]roviding assistive devices or
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
15. Id. § 12111(8).
16. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 ("[Tihe employer must make a
reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation. The appropriate reasonable
accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the
employer and the [employee] with a disability.").
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
18. Stephen F. Befort & Tracy Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE
2272004]
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personnel,"' 9 (3) "U]ob restructuring,"" and (4) "[r]eassignment to a vacant
position. 21
"Reassignment" undoubtedly serves as the most controversial of the ADA
reasonable accommodation provisions. Since the passage of the ADA,
situations have arisen in which disabled employees' reassignments conflict with
the seniority rights of other nondisabled employees, raising the issue of whether
the accommodation that violates employees' seniority rights is reasonable or
unreasonable under the ADA. Employers' bona fide seniority systems created
as a product of labor negotiations and placed into collective bargaining
agreements generally have been held to supersede the interests of the disabled
employee seeking accommodation.22 An interesting variation on this conflict
arises, however, when disabled employees seek accommodation that conflicts
with seniority systems not contained in collective bargaining agreements but
rather unilaterally created and enforced by employers.23
B. The Importance of Seniority Systems
Seniority systems of businesses have a storied history in employment law
because of the employment benefits and the economic security that such systems
provide. In 1980, the Supreme Court, in California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant,24
defined a "seniority system" as a "scheme that, alone or in tandem with non-
'seniority' criteria, allots to employees ever improving employment rights and
benefits as their relative lengths of pertinent employment increase., 25 Noting the
importance of the objective aspect of seniority systems, the Court stated that
"the principal feature of any and every 'seniority system' is that preferential
treatment is dispensed on the basis of some measure of time served in
L. REV. 1045, 1053-54 (2000) (discussing the four basic types of reasonable accommodations
under the ADA); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A).
19. Befort & Donesky, supra note 18; 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(9)(B).
20. Befort & Donesky, supra note 18; 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(9)(B).
21. Befort & Donesky, supra note 18; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). In Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999), the court stated that in reasonably accommodating
an employee under the ADA, an "employer should first consider lateral moves to positions that
are regarded as equivalent," and "may only consider lesser jobs that constitute a demotion if
there are no such equivalent positions available." Id. at 1177; see also 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(o) ("An employer may reassign an individual to a lower graded position if there are
no accommodations that would enable the employee to remain in the current position and there
are no vacant equivalent positions for which the individual is qualified with or without
reasonable accommodation.").
22. See discussion infra Part H.B.1.
23. See discussion infra Part lI.B.2.
24. 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
25. Id. at 606 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 57:225
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss1/10
NOTE
employment. ' 26 In upholding the seniority exemption under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,27 the Court reasoned that seniority systems vary
among particular industries or businesses and that the legislative history behind
the exemption does not suggest that courts should "prefer any particular variety
of seniority system over any other.
28
Moreover, courts, scholars, and, most importantly, employers and their
employees recognize the significant benefits that seniority systems provide to
the workplace. First, employment decisions including pay increases,
promotions, and job assignments are largely or entirely based on seniority
rights.29 Indeed, "the length of time an employee is associated with a particular
company, division, or position provides a fair, objective alternative criterion for
making" employment decisions that is both easily understood by employees and
objectively instituted by management." An employee's seniority rights,
therefore, act as a means of securing that employee's "due process" rights to
avoid and "limit[] nepotism and unfairness in personnel decisions."'" These due
process rights inevitably restrict management in imposing arbitrary and
nepotistic determinations for advancement, assignment, and termination.
3 2
Second, in addition to ensuring employee due process, seniority rights
effectively limit fierce workplace competition that "pits one worker against
another" by requiring all employees to submit to a hierarchal order of
advancement.33 Thus, employees who normally would "fight[] among
themselves over scarce opportunities and curry[] favor with supervisors," instead
26. Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000); see Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 352 (1977) ("[U]nmistakable purpose of [Title VII's seniority defense] was to make clear
that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title
VII.").
28. Cal. Brewers Ass'n, 444 U.S. at 608; see TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). The
Supreme Court noted the importance of seniority systems under collective bargaining, stating
that "[c]ollective bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable agreements between
management and labor, lies at the core of our national labor policy, and seniority provisions are
universally included in these contracts." Id. at 79.
29. Susan Gardner & James F. Morgan, The Supreme Court to Decide: Seniority Rights or
Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 52 LAB. L.J.
234, 235 (2001).
30. Id.
31. Carl Gersuny, Origins of Seniority Provisions in Collective Bargaining, 33 LAB. L.J.
518,519 (1982) (employees usually view seniority as an important indicator of corporate loyalty
and job commitment).
32. Id. Gersuny reasoned that "[s]eniority is germane to due process because its
implementation serves to restrict management's capacity for applying arbitrary and capricious
criteria in making invidious distinctions among employees." Id.
33. Id.
22920041
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rely on and adhere to seniority rights based on a "hierarchic principle based on
institutional age."'  Finally, seniority systems provide economic security to
employees in times of economic downturn, massive layoffs, or steady reductions
in the employer's workforce.35 When layoffs occur, an employee's "chances of
being retained or recalled will very likely depend upon such factors as the basis
for determining seniority preference."36 Thus, seniority systems not only ensure
neutrality in receiving numerous employment benefits, but they also provide
employees with both employment security and economic reliability.37
C. Seniority Rights Under a Bona Fide Seniority System
The issue of whether violating a seniority provision should operate as a per
se bar to employers providing a reasonable accommodation under the ADA has
been the source of tremendous controversy. Scholars have observed that this
issue usually arises in "two contexts: (1) the existence of a collectively-
bargained-for clause that enables union employees with seniority to receive
preference for requested transfers, and (2) the existence of an employer-
instituted seniority provision that provides the same benefit for employees in a
non-unionized setting."3
34. Id.
35. Benjamin Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority
Rights, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1532, 1535 (1962).
36. Id. (arguing that "[i]n industries characterized by a steady reduction in total
employment, the employee's length of service is his principal protection against the loss of his
job").
37. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,766 (1976) ("Seniority systems
and the entitlements conferred by credits earned thereunder are of vast and increasing
importance in the economic employment system of this Nation. Seniority principles are
increasingly used to allocate entitlements to scarce benefits among competing employees...
and to compute noncompetitive benefits earned under the contract of employment ....")
(citation omitted). For a general description of the possible benefits conferred upon employees
under seniority systems, see Donald R. Stacy, Title VII Seniority Remedies in a Time of
Economic Downturn, 28 VAND. L. REV. 487, 490 (1975):
Included among the benefits, options, and safeguards affected by competitive
status seniority, are not only promotion and layoff, but also transfer, demotion,
rest days, shift assignments, prerogative in scheduling vacation, order of layoff,
possibilities of lateral transfer to avoid layoff, "bumping" possibilities in the face
of layoff, order of recall, training opportunities, working conditions, length of
layoff endured without reducing seniority, length of layoff recall rights will
withstand, overtime opportunities, parking privileges, and, in one plant, a
preferred place in the punch-out line.
Id. (citations omitted).
38. Gardner & Morgan, supra note 29, at 237.
230 [Vol. 57:225
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1. Employee Seniority Rights Under a Collective Bargaining Agreement
Most courts have followed a bright-line approach in holding that violating
employee seniority rights prescribed in a bona fide collective bargaining
agreement constitutes a per se bar to employers in making a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.39 In Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,4° the
39. See, e.g., Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 244 F.3d 675, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[An
accommodation that is contrary to the seniority rights of other employees set forth in a CBA
would be unreasonable per se."); Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247,257 (6th Cir.
2000) (finding that an employer need not "waive legitimate, non-discriminatory employment
policies or displace other employees' rights to be considered in order to accommodate the
disabled individual"); Boersig v. Union Elec. Co., 219 F.3d 816, 822 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting
the importance of protecting seniority rights under a collective bargaining agreement from the
"unnecessary interference arising from the perceived need to accommodate a disabled employee
under the ADA"); Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1307 (1lth Cir. 2000)
("[A]n accommodation that contravenes the seniority rights of other employees under a
collective bargaining agreement is unreasonable as a matter of law."); Aldrich v. Boeing Co.,
146 F.3d 1265, 1271 n.5 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the ADA does not require Boeing to
transfer an employee to a position that would violate the seniority provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 1998)
("Nothing in the ADA requires an employer to abandon its legitimate, nondiscriminatory
company policies defining job qualifications, prerequisites, and entitlements to intra-company
transfers."); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[A]
reassignment will not require creating a new job, moving another employee, promoting the
disabled employee, or violating another employee's rights under a collective bargaining
agreement."); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[A]n accommodation to one
employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining
agreement simply is not reasonable."); Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1225
(11 th Cir. 1997) (finding a reassignment under the ADA unreasonable because the position to
which the Plaintiff requested reassignment conflicted with a collective bargaining agreement);
Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that "the ADA
does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other
workers under a collective bargaining agreement"); Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041,
1051 (7th Cir. 1996) ("After examining the text, background, and legislative history of the ADA
duty of 'reasonable accommodation,' we conclude that the ADA does not require disabled
individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority
rights of other employees."); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that "[tihe ADA does not require that Northwest take action inconsistent with the
contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement"); Wooten v.
Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Farmland Foods had no obligation to
terminate other employees or violate a collective bargaining agreement in order to accommodate
Wooten .... ); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1995) (city was
not required to fundamentally alter its program or "violate[] [its] rules and regulations" to
accommodate an employee because such action would cause undue hardship); Milton v.
Scrivner, 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[Clollective bargaining agreement prohibits
[employees'] transfer to any other job because [they] lack the requisite seniority."). But see Aka
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Seventh Circuit defined "bona fide" seniority systems as those created for
legitimate rather than discriminatory purposes.4 ' After finding the seniority
system under the collective bargaining agreement to be bona fide, the court held
that "the special treatment demanded by Eckles simply is not required as a
'reasonable accommodation' under the ADA, due to its effects on the legitimate
seniority rights of other employees."42 The Eckles court correctly reasoned that
the true conflict in these types of cases is not "between the rights of the disabled
individual and his employer and union, but between the rights of the disabled
individual and those of his [more senior] co-workers. 43
Furthermore, in Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc.," the Seventh
Circuit recognized both the limitations on an employer's duty to reassign under
the ADA and the importance of seniority rights under collective bargaining
agreements. The Dalton court held that "[n]othing in the ADA requires an
employer to abandon its legitimate, nondiscriminatory company policies
defining job qualifications, prerequisites, and entitlements to intra-company
transfers. 45 In addition, the court admitted that it had not found any ADA or
Rehabilitation Act46 case that required employers to reassign disabled
employees to a position when such a transfer would "violate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory policy of the employer."47 Moreover, in Davis v. Florida Power
v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (viewing a seniority system
under a CBA as merely a factor in determining undue hardship for making a reasonable
accommodation for a disabled employee).
40. 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996).
41. Id. at 1046 n.7.
42. Id. at 1045.
43. Id. at 1046.
44. 141 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1998).
45. Id. at 678.
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000). See McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg. U.S.A. Inc., 110 F.3d
369, 373 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[C]ourts have universally looked to Rehabilitation Act cases as
a source of guidance when construing the ADA."); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492,
497 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the definition of "reasonable accommodation" in the
Rehabilitation Act is the same as that in the ADA). For examples of cases upholding the general
rule under the Rehabilitation Act that reassignment of an employee in violation of a collective
bargaining agreement or seniority system is per se unreasonable, see Mason v. Frank, 32 F.3d
315, 319-20 (8th Cir. 1994); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467-68 (4th Cir. 1987); Jasany v.
United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (6th Cir. 1985); Daubert v. United States
Postal Service, 733 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984). For cases upholding seniority systems
under Title VII, see generally TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977). In Hardison, the
Supreme Court held that TWA was not required to take steps inconsistent with a valid collective
bargaining agreement. Id. For more discussion of Hardison and the Rehabilitation Act, see
infra Part IV.A.2.
47. Dalton, 141 F.3d at 679; see Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1225 (1 lth
Cir. 1997).
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& Light Co., 4 8 the Eleventh Circuit held that the ADA does not require
accommodations that contravene the seniority rights of other employees under
a collective bargaining agreement.49 The Davis court cited authority from eight
other circuits holding that such accommodations are unreasonable as a matter
of law."
2. An Employer's Unilaterally Imposed Seniority System
Precedent also exists for honoring the seniority provisions under employers'
own unilaterally created and imposed seniority systems. The Tenth Circuit, in
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., ' spoke of the importance of other fundamental
employer policies in determining the reasonableness of an ADA
accommodation. In support of honoring seniority policies not necessarily
contained in collective bargaining agreements, the Smith court recognized that
violating neutral employment policies in making a reassignment is
unreasonable.53 Furthermore, the court noted that a particular industry could
have a well-entrenched seniority system that would give rise to legitimate
expectations by more senior employees of a job that disabled employees may
desire.' Thus, "[r]equiring an employer to disrupt and violate ... reasonable
expectations of seniority rights in order to favor a disabled employee.., could
... constitute a fundamental and unreasonable [disruption] of the employer's
business."55
Following the rationale expressed by the Tenth Circuit in Smith, at least one
court has held that seniority rights in employer-created seniority systems deserve
the same legal recognition as those seniority rights contained within collective
bargaining agreements. In EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp.,56 the Fourth Circuit directly
addressed the issue of reasonable accommodation when the reassignment of
disabled employees conflicts with employers' own unilaterally created and
imposed seniority systems. In Sara Lee, a disabled employee was forced to take
another shift because more senior employees opted to displace workers after a
plant closed in another city.57 The seniority policy in question was "an internal
48. 205 F.3d 1301 (1lth Cir. 2000).
49. Id. at 1306.
50. Id. at 1307.
51. 180 F.3d 1154 (10thCir. 1999). For a detailed discussion of Smith's holding, see infra
Part IV.B.2.
52. Id. at 1175-76.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 237 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2001).
57. Id. at351.
2004] 233
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policy of Sara Lee and [was] not part of a collective bargaining agreement.""
In articulating the benefits of seniority systems and defending their importance
to both employers and employees, whether under collective bargaining
agreements or unilaterally imposed systems, the court stated:
No reason exists for creating a different rule for legitimate and non-
discriminatory policies that are not a part of a collective bargaining
agreement. All workers - not just those covered by collective
bargaining agreements - rely upon established company policies.
The ADA does not require employers to disrupt the operation of a
defensible and non-discriminatory company policy in order to
provide a reasonable accommodation.
In April 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court faced this unique employment conflict
for the first time. The stage had been set for the Court to uphold seniority
systems regardless of whether they originate under a collective bargaining
agreement or from employers' unilaterally imposed seniority systems. Instead,
the Court intervened and mistakenly created a new standard and judicial
balancing test that were both unnecessary and without precedential basis. The
Court ultimately failed to recognize that the true conflict in cases like Barnett
is not between employers and the disabled employees but rather between the
disabled employees and the nondisabled employees whose seniority rights are
being violated.'
I1. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett: The Supreme Court Decides
A. Factual Background
In 1990, Robert Barnett injured his back while working as a cargo handler for
U.S. Airways at San Francisco International Airport and could no longer
perform his heavy-lifting duties.6' After returning from disability leave, Barnett
used his seniority to transfer to a physically less-demanding mail room job.
"Barnett learned in August of 1992 that two employees with greater seniority
58. Id.
59. Id. at 355; see also Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 1998)
(noting that Frontier was not required to revise its own bidding system to accommodate disabled
employee); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that
"even if there were no CBA in place, B & W would not be obligated to accommodate Foreman
by reassigning him to a new position"); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir.
1996) (finding significant limitations on an employer's potential obligation to reassign a
disabled employee as a reasonable accommodation).
60. Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 1996).
61. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Barnett 1).
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planned to exercise their seniority right to transfer to [Barnett's position in] the
mail room. Once bumped, Barnett's seniority would have limited him to
transferring to jobs in the cargo area."62 Barnett asked the company to let him
remain in the mail room "as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA."63
U.S. Airways allowed Barnett to remain in the mail room for five months before
informing him in January 1993 that he would be removed from the mail room
and would eventually lose his job.'
B. Procedural History
In February 1993, Barnett filed charges of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).65 In August 1994, the EEOC
determined that "there was reason to believe that U.S. Air had discriminated
against Barnett by denying him reasonable accommodation under the ADA."6
Barnett then filed suit against U.S. Airways in federal district court. The district
court granted U.S. Airways summary judgment, finding that altering the
seniority system "would result in undue hardship to both [U.S. Airways] and its
non-disabled employees."'67
While the Ninth Circuit affirmed,6' the en banc Ninth Circuit court reversed,
however, holding that violating a seniority system that is not grounded in a
collective bargaining agreement is not a per se violation when considering
reassignment as a reasonable accommodation.69 Instead of a per se rule of
unreasonableness, the court held that a seniority system should merely be one
factor in a fact-intensive undue hardship analysis "to determine whether [the]
particular reassignment would constitute an undue hardship to the employer."7
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit's primary consideration in reversing
the district court was that U.S. Airways' seniority system was unilaterally
imposed rather than the product of "bargained for rights" contained in a
collective bargaining agreement.7'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the dispute between
seniority rights and reasonable accommodation under the ADA.72 The Court
articulated this conflict as the tension "between (1) the interests of a disabled
62. Id. at 1108-09.
63. Id. at 1109.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 395 (2002) (Barnett II).
68. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 754 (9th Cir. 1998).
69. Barnett , 228 F.3d at 1119-20.
70. Id. at 1120.
71. Id. at 1119.
72. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 532 U.S. 970 (2001).
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worker who seeks reassignment... as a 'reasonable accommodation' [of his
disability], and (2) the interests of [non-disabled] workers with superior
[seniority] rights to bid for the job under [the] employer's seniority system."73
C. The Primary Issue Before the Court
The Supreme Court articulated the issue on appeal as "whether a proposed
accommodation that would normally be reasonable [under the ADA] is rendered
unreasonable because the assignment would violate a seniority system's rules. 74
However, as one author wrote, the real issue "was whether seniority rules
unilaterally imposed by the employer require a different employer defense than
seniority rules established via a [collective bargaining agreement]."7
D. The Court's Balancing Approach
The Supreme Court held that if employers can demonstrate that a requested
accommodation conflicts with the rules of their seniority systems, then such a
showing ordinarily is sufficient to prove that the accommodation is
unreasonable. 76  The Court reasoned that such a conflict between an
accommodation and employers' seniority rules entitles employees to summary
judgment on the question of reasonableness.77 Nevertheless, the Court allowed
a seniority-rule exception, stating that employees "remain[] free to show that
special circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the presence of a seniority
system .... the requested 'accommodation' is 'reasonable' on the particular
facts. 78 Such a showing, the Court noted, will defeat employers' summary
judgment demands.7 9
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, identified two examples of particular
facts or "special circumstances" when a reassignment that violates the
provisions of a bona fide seniority system would still be reasonable under the
ADA.8" The first case would involve employers that, "having retained the right
to change the seniority system unilaterally," alter the conditions of the system
too frequently.8 The result, the Court stated, would be the reduction of
"employee expectations that the [seniority] system will be followed"; therefore,
73. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002) (Barnett If).
74. Id. at 392.
75. Art Gutman, On the Legal Front: The Supreme Court Ruling in U.S. Airways v.
Barnett, INDUS.-ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST, July 2002, at 90, 91.
76. Barnett II, 535 U.S. at 403.
77. See id. at 405.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
80. Barnett II, 535 U.S. at 405.
81. Id.
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one more change to accommodate disabled employees would make little
difference to employers or the expectations of nondisabled employees.82 The
second instance would be when an employers' unilateral seniority systems
contain exceptions that have already been used in the past so that one further
exception likely would not make much difference.83 Justice Breyer concluded
that plaintiffs bear the burden to show these "special circumstances" making "an
exception from the seniority system reasonable in [a] particular case."'
E. Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Scalia, Joined by Justice Thomas: Seniority Always Prevails
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, accused the majority of
"[indulging its penchant for eschewing clear rules that might avoid litigation,"
and answering "maybe" to whether reasonable accommodation under the ADA
"requires reassignment of a disabled employee to a position that [conflicts with]
the employer's bona fide and established seniority system."85 Justice Scalia
argued that the Court misinterpreted the ADA when it concluded that the ADA
could override any bona fide seniority system, either unilaterally imposed by
management or the product of a collective bargaining agreement.86
Justice Scalia first contended that the ADA's statutory language "provides
that discrimination includes 'not making reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability."8" He then reasoned that "the ADA eliminates workplace barriers
only if a disability prevents an employee from overcoming them - those
barriers that would not be barriers but for the employee's disability."8 Thus, he
concluded that the ADA "does not envision the elimination of obstacles to the
employee's service in the new position that have nothing to do with his
disability - for example, another employee's claim to that position under a
seniority system."89
In addition, Justice Scalia countered that the Court should adopt a clear-cut
rule that would protect seniority systems of all kinds, regardless of whether they
are contained in a collective bargaining agreement or a unilaterally instituted
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 406.
85. Id. at 411-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 412-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
88. Barnett II, 535 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Jonathan David Bible, U.S. Airways v. Barnett:
Seniority Systems and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 LAB. L.J. 61, 66 (2002).
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system.' Justice Scalia noted that the Court's rebuttable presumption provides
employees with not only "the opportunity to unmask sham seniority systems,"
but that "it [also] gives them a vague and unspecified power (whenever they can
show 'special circumstances') to undercut bonafide systems."9'
2. Justice Souter, Joined by Justice Ginsburg: Seniority Never Prevails
At first glance, one might view the 5-4 decision in Barnett as an extremely
close decision issued by a very divided Court. In reality, only Justice Souter,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed with the Ninth Circuit's ruling and would
have maintained a burden on employers with unilaterally instituted seniority
systems to show that accommodation of the employee would cause specific
"undue hardship" on the employer.92 Although both Justice Souter and Justice
Scalia authored dissenting opinions, they took opposite viewpoints.
Justice Souter argued primarily that the ADA, unlike Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196493 (Title VII) and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act94 (ADEA), does not protect seniority rules from reasonable accommodation
because the ADA contains no statutory bona fide seniority system defense. 95
Because Congress modeled the ADA after Title VII, 96 Justice Souter reasoned
that the "failure to replicate Title Vi's exemption for seniority systems leaves
the statute ambiguous, albeit with more than a hint that seniority rules do not
inevitably carry the day." 97 In addition, Justice Souter noted that both the
House98 and Senate99 reports provide that seniority systems should only be one
factor in an overall reasonable analysis.'0° Thus, Justice Souter concluded that
if Congress considered seniority rights in collective bargaining agreements as
"no more than a factor in the analysis, [then] surely no greater weight was meant
for a seniority scheme like the one before us, unilaterally imposed by the
90. Barnett 11, 535 U.S. at 418-19.
91. Id. at 419.
92. Id. at 420-24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this
subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to [provide
different benefits to employees] pursuant to a bona fide seniority ... system.").
94. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2000) ("It shall not be unlawful for an employer.., to take any
action otherwise prohibited under [previous sections] ... to observe the terms of a bona fide
seniority system ... ").
95. Barnett II, 535 U.S. at 420 (Souter, J., dissenting).
96. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22, 54, 76-77 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 336, 358-60; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2, 25,43 (1989).
97. Barnett II, 535 U.S. at 421 (Souter, J., dissenting).
98. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63.
99. See S.REP.No. 101-116, at 32.
100. Barnett II, 535 U.S. at 421 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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employer, and, unlike collective-bargaining agreements, not singled out for
protection by any... federal statute."'0 '
IV. Analysis and Policy Implications
A. Why the Majority's Balancing Test Does Not Work'02
1. Collective Bargaining Agreements v. Employer Instituted Systems
The most intriguing aspect of the majority opinion is that it fails to
distinguish between the seniority rules under a collective bargaining agreement
and the seniority rules under an employer's unilaterally imposed system. After
noting that most courts have found that seniority systems trump the need of
reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the Court stated that the relevant
seniority advantages and the related difficulties that result in violating seniority
provisions are not limited to seniority systems contained in collective bargaining
agreements.'0 3 The Court recognized that seniority systems and employee
seniority rights, management-imposed or not, provide objectivity, reliability, and
an overall atmosphere of trustworthiness that give employees an incentive "to
invest in the employing company."'
' 04
Logic compels that if the Court were not going to distinguish between
collective bargaining agreements and unilaterally imposed seniority systems,
then the Court would follow judicial precedent addressing seniority systems
under collective bargaining agreements.0 5 The Court's holding would make
much more sense had it directly addressed "whether an employer's unilaterally
imposed seniority system trumps a disabled employee's right to
101. Id. at 422 (Souter, J., dissenting).
102. See Robert S. Greenberger, Career Journal: Justices Back Seniority in Disability Case,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2002, at B12. This article discusses that some in the legal community,
representing both management and disabled workers, have reacted positively to the Court's
ruling. One law professor remarked: "'It is an eminently reasonable opinion, which doesn't give
either people with disabilities or employers everything they want, but strikes the right balance
in crafting a workable law."' Id. In addition, a management lawyer stated that "'[it certainly
doesn't gut the obligation to make 'reasonable accommodation'... it just says that in this case
the seniority rules at least create a presumption that accommodation that seeks to trump those
rules isn't reasonable."' Id. Meanwhile, in her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor seems
to concur only to be agreeable. Justice O'Connor states that she supported the majority's
opinion "[b]ecause I think the Court's test will often lead to the correct outcome, and because
I think it important that a majority of the Court agree on a rule when interpreting statutes."
Barnett II, 535 U.S. at 411 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103. Barnett II, 535 U.S. at 403-04.
104. Id. at 404.
105. See cases cited supra note 39.
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reassignment."" 6 As discussed in Part I of this note, most courts had applied
a bright-line per se rule of unreasonableness when they found that
accommodations violated the seniority rules under collective bargaining
agreements. 7 In effect, the Court's ruling destroyed the burden that the Ninth
Circuit had placed on employers to defend such unilaterally imposed systems
and then illogically failed to follow a bright-line rule of unreasonableness.
Instead, the Court introduced a balancing test requiring employees to
demonstrate "special circumstances" that would make an exception from any
seniority system reasonable. °8
2. Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA
The second failure of the Court's opinion is that it expands the meaning of
"reasonable accommodation" under its new balancing approach to include
reassignment in conflict with more senior nondisabled employees. '09 In contrast
to other accommodations, such as making facilities accessible or making
adjustments for disabled employees in their current positions, reassignment
under the ADA directly impacts the rights of nondisabled workers. Because
reassignment can deprive more senior employees of the possibility of filling a
particular position, Justice Scalia views this type of accommodation as
preferential and per se unreasonable under the ADA. "0 To understand Justice
Scalia's bright-line approach in Barnett and his inference of affirmative action
in the Court's opinion, and especially in Justice Souter' s dissent, it is imperative
to compare the "reasonable accommodation" provision of the ADA with
antidiscrimination statutes like Title VII and the ADEA, and the ADA's
statutory predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. "'
106. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Barnett 1).
The Ninth Circuit offered this question as one that had never previously been addressed. Id. But
see EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2001).
107. See supra Part II.B.1.
108. Gutman, supra note 75, at 91.
109. Although most of this section disputes the reasoning behind Justice Souter's dissent,
the majority's opinion creates an opportunity for preferential treatment and rejects Scalia's
approach and interpretation of reasonable accommodation under the ADA. See Barnettll, 535
U.S. at 398 (finding that "[t]he simple fact that an accommodation would provide a 'preference'
... cannot in and of itself, automatically show that the accommodation is not 'reasonable.' As
a result, we reject the position taken by US Airways and Justice Scalia to the contrary.").
110. See id. at 414 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When one departs from this understanding, the
ADA's accommodation provision becomes a standardless grab bag - leaving it to the courts
to decide which workplace preferences... can be deemed 'reasonable' to 'make up for' the
particular employee's disability"); see also EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024
(7th Cir. 2000).
111. See Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1049 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that
the ADA duty of reasonable accommodation is not equivalent to that under Title VII or the
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Both Title VII and the ADEA prohibit employer discrimination without an
obligation to provide for or assist employees in their job performance.' 12 The
main argument against Justice Scalia's line-drawing approach is that, by
requiring reasonable accommodation for the disabled under the ADA, Congress
intended to go beyond just prohibiting invidious discrimination against the
disabled. Indeed, it intended to obligate employers to take proactive measures
through accommodation. 13 Thus, opponents of Justice Scalia's approach,
including Justice Souter in his dissent, conclude that it should be reasonable for
employers to violate their seniority policies to reassign disabled employees." 4
Discussion surrounding the Supreme Court's decision in TWA v. Hardison,"5
however, sheds significant light upon this debate." 6 In Hardison, the Supreme
Court considered a conflict between the religious accommodation provision
under Title VII117 and the seniority rights of other employees under a collective
bargaining agreement."' Hardison asked to be relieved from working on
Saturdays because of his religious beliefs." 9 The Supreme Court rejected
Hardison' s requested accommodation, holding that the statutory requirement to
accommodate does not supersede the seniority rights of other employees under
a collective bargaining agreement. 2 0 The Court reasoned that "[w]ithout a clear
and express indication from Congress," a seniority system need not "give way
when necessary to accommodate religious observances."'' Furthermore, the
Court found that "[tlo require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order
to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship."'22
Opponents of Justice Scalia' s bright-line approach argue that Hardison is not
applicable to ADA reasonable accommodation situations for two reasons. First,
in contrast to the ADA, Title VII contains a specific statutory affirmative
Rehabilatation Act, but noting the "usefulness of these acts for understanding the basic meaning
of the term as it was being used at the time Congress decided to employ it within the ADA").
112. Befort & Donesky, supra note 18, at 1047.
113. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5, at 368.
114. Id.
115. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
116. Equal protection considerations are especially inherent to Title VII decisions involving
race. Thus, it may be more appropriate to consider Title VII cases involving religious
accommodations. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5, at 368.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). Under this Title VII provision, an employer must
"reasonably accommodate" the religious observances and practices of its employees to the
extent that the accommodation does not constitute "undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business." Id.
118. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 69.
119. Id. at68.
120. Id. at 79.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 84.
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defense for employer seniority systems. 13 Second, the Senate and House reports
on the ADA specifically clarify that Hardison's finding that only de minimis
costs are necessary to constitute an unreasonable accommodation does not apply
to the ADA. 24 Both of these arguments fail for several reasons.
First, the Hardison Court specifically stated that the same decision would
have been reached even without the statutory seniority system affirmative
defense under Title Vll.'" Thus, the Court did not find the statutory provision
necessary to find the accommodation unreasonable because of the detrimental
consequences that result from violating neutral and legitimate employer
seniority policies. Second, the ADA's statutory predecessor, the Rehabilitation
Act, similarly contains no statutory affirmative defense for seniority systems,
and yet courts have unanimously rejected reasonable accommodation claims
under the Rehabilitation Act where reassignment conflicts with bona fide
seniority rights. 26 Because courts look to the Rehabilitation Act to interpret the
ADA,127 proponents of the bright-line approach argue that "the absence of an
express protection of seniority rights in the ADA is not determinative. "128 In
addition, the Seventh Circuit noted that in regard to the House and Senate
Reports, the context of the Reports clearly demonstrates that "Congress intended
[only] to reject the de minimis rule of Hardison, rather than the [Court's]
holding ... or the refusal to require an employer to violate the seniority rights
of other employees to accommodate the religious restrictions of the
[employee].', 129 Furthermore, if Congress had intended to reject Hardison
completely, it could have inserted restrictive language into the ADA enabling
disabled employees to trump the seniority rights of other employees when being
reassigned. No such statutory language exists in the ADA, and, as discussed in
Part IV.B. I of this note, reliance on committee reports can be a very arbitrary
and inconclusive process.
123. See supra note 93.
124. The House Report states: "By contrast, under the ADA, reasonable accommodations
must be provided unless they rise to the level of 'requiring significant difficulty or expense' on
the part of the employer, in light of the factors noted in the statute - i.e., a significantly higher
standard than that articulation in Hardison." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990).
125. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79-82 (noting the Court's already-stated conclusion was
"supported by the fact that seniority systems are afforded special treatment under Title VII
itself").
126. See cases cited supra note 46.
127. See McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg. U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 373 n.l (6th Cir. 1997)
("[C]ourts have universally looked to Rehabilitation Act cases as a source of guidance when
construing the ADA.").
128. See Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1049 n.13 (7th Cir. 1996).
129. Id. at 1049 n.12.
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Although Barnett holds that a reassignment in violation of a seniority system
ordinarily will be unreasonable, the opportunity exists, nonetheless, for disabled
employees to trump more senior employees. Barnett' s new balancing approach
creates this opportunity and should be viewed as preferential treatment
unwarranted by the ADA, such antidiscrimination statutes as Title VII and the
ADEA, and the Rehabilitation Act. 3 ' Justice Scalia's bright-line approach
follows established precedent and avoids accommodating disabled employees
in a manner that is both unrelated to their disability and that adversely affects
other employees. 3 '
3. Justice Scalia's Policy Concerns: Litigation and Inconsistency
Perhaps most troubling, the majority's decision ensures that employers
generally will not succeed on summary judgment. In the past, to prevail on
summary judgment, employers generally could prove accommodation to be
unreasonable by showing that it required them to violate the provisions of either
their own seniority policy or the seniority policies of collective bargaining
agreements.' 32 Under Barnett, however, employers will rarely, if ever, have
such an opportunity because the newly created rebuttable presumption
concerning the administration of their seniority systems is a question of fact that
will undoubtedly defeat their summary judgment motions.'33 Most likely, with
regard to such determinations as "unlikely to matter" and "not likely to make a
difference," the new presumption will require litigants to spend significant time,
attention, and money driving the discovery phase of the lawsuit."3 More
importantly, because such issues are so fact-intensive, the presumption will
significantly reduce the number of summary judgments granted. 3 '
Furthermore, under the Court's ruling, employees are entitled to an exception
from the reasonableness of employers' seniority systems if they can show that
"one more departure [from the seniority rules] will not likely make a
difference."'' 36 As Justice Scalia so aptly stated in his dissent, "I have no idea
130. See The Supreme Court- Leading Cases, 116 HARV. L. REV. 200,342 (2002) (noting
that "Barnen joins a growing line of rulings that implicitly reject the possibility that Congress
intended the ADA to reach farther than other antidiscrimination statutes").
131. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5, at 369 (suggesting that Justice Scalia should
"provide more of an explanation as to why the lines he wants to draw are consistent with
Congress's social welfare instinct that animates the ADA, when there are no constitutional
impediments to reading that statute more broadly").
132. See supra note 39.
133. Bible, supra note 89, at 67.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002) (BarnettlI).
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what this means."' 13 7 Justice Scalia further questioned the new standard by
asking, "When is it possible for a departure from seniority rules to 'not likely
make a difference'?".'38 The parameters of this vague and unclear standard,
Scalia insists, will "be resolved only by constant litigation."' 139 For example, the
Supreme Court remanded this case to give Barnett the opportunity to show
exceptions to U.S. Airways' seniority system.14 However, the district court had
already made several findings with respect to the system. The court had found
that the "'evidence show[ed] that the [U.S. Airways] seniority system ha[d] been
in place for "decades" and governs over 14,000 [employees]."" 4 Moreover, the
district court explained that the "'seniority policies [of U.S. Airways were]
common to the airline industry' and that U.S. Airways' "'employees were
justified in relying upon the [seniority] policy.""' 142 Thus, the court concluded,
"'any significant alteration of that policy would result in undue hardship to both
the company and its non-disabled employees." '141
Thus, in Bamett, the Supreme Court essentially required more litigation to
determine an issue on which the district court had already ruled. Judicial
efficiency, financial considerations, and common sense all cry out for a more
definite and clearer standard in interpreting the ADA. It is important to note that
most courts in considering the legality of seniority systems had previously
upheld only those that were "bona fide" and those company policies that were
"legitimate and non-discriminatory."' 44  This initial determination of the
legitimacy of a seniority system would achieve the same purposes that the
Barnett court sought to achieve by inventing the new rebuttable presumption,
but without the increased time and effort expended in unnecessary litigation.
Why the Court chose to abandon these initial considerations for a vague and
completely new standard is difficult to comprehend.
One scholar has noted that Barnett's rebuttable presumption "is ...
problematic in meaning and possible implications and is unsupported by the
authorities cited for it."' 45 One of these problems includes determining how
many past changes in the administration of the employer's seniority system an
employee will have to show for a court to determine that one more change "'will
137. Id. at 418 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 406.
141. Id. at 395 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 96a).
142. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 96a).
143. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 96a).
144. See supra Part II.B.
145. Bible, supra note 89, at 67.
[Vol. 57:225
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss1/10
NOTE
not likely make a difference. '""'  Another obstacle is determining how many
exceptions and what kind of exceptions an employer must have made in the past
so that making one more exception accommodating a disabled employee is
"'unlikely to matter." 47 Undoubtedly, the result will be that "judges and juries,
at trial, will necessarily reach widely varying conclusions" and interpretations
of these questions.1
41
Since the Court's ruling in Barnett, lower courts have extended and
interpreted the decision in various ways. For example, in Shapiro v. Township
of Lakewood,49 the Third Circuit extended the two-step approach outlined in
Barnett to cover analyzing a reassignment that would violate any disability-
neutral rule of an employer. 50 In addition, the Tenth Circuit, in Dilley v.
Supervalu, Inc., 51 held that Barnett prohibits only a direct, rather than "a
potential violation of [a] seniority system."'52 Thus, employers' contentions that
their "seniority system would be violated if a more senior employee later
requested to be placed in [the disabled employee's] position" does not make the
accommodation unreasonable. 1
53
One case in particular demonstrates why the Barnett Court erred in creating
a new standard to evaluate an accommodation that conflicts with a bona fide
seniority system. In EEOC v. Valu Merchandisers Co., M the trial court denied
the employer's summaryjudgment motion simply because the court held that the
seniority system in question was not bona fide.'55 The court reasoned that
because the employer's seniority system gave itself "unfettered discretion in
deciding whether to implement its seniority policy or waive it altogether," the
seniority system was neither legitimate nor nondiscriminatory.'56 As indicated
in Part II of this note, prior to Barnett, most courts upheld only those seniority
systems that were bona fide or that were legitimate and created for
nondiscriminatory purposes.' Even before Barnett, courts considered this
determination of the seniority system to be a question of law that preceded any
inquiry into the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation.'58 However,
146. Id. (quoting Barnett II, 535 U.S. at 405).
147. Id. (quoting Barnett I1, 535 U.S. at 405).
148. Id. at 67-68.
149. 292 F.3d 356 (3d Cir. 2002).
150. Id. at 361.
151. 296 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 2002).
152. Id. at 963.
153. Id.
154. No. 01-2224-DJW, 2002 WL 1932533 (D. Kan. Aug. 9, 2002).
155. Id. at *7.
156. Id. at *8.
157. See discussion supra Part ll.B.2.
158. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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Barnett treats this inquiry as an extremely fact-intensive process that
investigates the history behind the administration of the seniority system to
establish consistency standards set forth under the Court's newly created
rebuttable presumption. The Valu Merchandisers court reverted to a pre-Barnett
inquiry by first ruling on the bona fide aspect of the employer's seniority system,
and in so doing, protected the rights of a disabled employee from the possible
discrimination of an employer. Thus, Valu Merchandisers shows that the
protections sought by the Barnett Court can be achieved through the initial
determination of the legitimacy of a seniority system but without the long and
exhausting discovery process resulting from Barnett. The Valu Merchandisers
case simply provides further evidence of why the Court's intervention in Barnett
was both unnecessary and inconsistent.
B. Why Justice Souter's Dissent Does Not Work
1. Legislative Intent v. Textualism
Both Justice Souter and the Ninth Circuit relied on the EEOC enforcement
guidelines 59 and the ADA's legislative history"6 to conclude that seniority
systems must only be a factor in determining undue hardship for employers with
unilaterally created seniority systems. 6' The Ninth Circuit ironically noted,
however, that even though the EEOC and the legislative history rejected anyper
se rule barring accommodation when reassignment would conflict with
collective bargaining agreements, most circuits, including its own, have reached
the opposite conclusion and have held that the ADA does not require an
accommodation when there is a conflict with seniority rights under collective
bargaining agreements. 62 As evidence of this difference, the Ninth Circuit
distinguished Barnett in the subsequent case of Willis v. Pacific Maritime
Ass 'n,6 3 holding that an ADA accommodation "would be per se unreasonable
where.., the collective bargaining agreement contain[ed] bona fide seniority
provisions."'" Justice Souter's reliance, therefore, on the Ninth Circuit's use of
the legislative history in rejecting a per se rule for unilaterally created seniority
systems seems somewhat misplaced considering Willis' lack of reliance on the
159. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Barnett l);
see U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, COMPUANCE MANUAL 5454 (noting that if
employers have a policy prohibiting transfers, they must modify that policy to reassign disabled
employees unless they can show that doing so would cause undue hardship).
160. Barnet I, 228 F.3d at 1119; see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990).
161. BamettI,228F.3dat 1119-20.
162. Id. at 1120 n.9.
163. 244 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2001).
164. Id. at 677.
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EEOC and the legislative history in accepting a per se rule for seniority systems
under bona fide collective bargaining agreements. 6 5
In picking and choosing when to rely on legislative intent, Justice Souter and
the Ninth Circuit serve as prime examples of why Justice Scalia in Barnett
found no merit in the language of the House and Senate reports. A noted
opponent of inquiring into the minds of legislators, Justice Scalia has argued that
such subjective adventures are unproductive and that only a statute's particular
language should govern a court's investigation into that statute's meaning.
According to Justice Scalia, such subjective inquiries to discern the motivation
behind why legislators voted for a particular piece of legislation are "almost
always an impossible task."'" In addition, Justice Scalia has questioned the
reliability of committee reports that supposedly summarize the consensus of the
legislative intent behind the passing of a statue: "Can we assume, then, that [the
legislators] all agree with the motivation expressed in the staff-prepared
committee reports they might have read - even though we are unwilling to
assume that they agreed with the motivation expressed in the very statute that
they voted for?"'67
2. Affirmative Action?
Most affirmative action questions under the ADA arise in situations
involving a reassignment to a vacant position. For example, in Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc., the Tenth Circuit held that the ADA mandated the reassignment of
a disabled employee despite the superior qualifications of another applicant or
employee. 68 The court stated that a reasonable accommodation may require
reassignment to a vacantposition if (1) "no reasonable accommodation can keep
the employee in his or her existing job," (2) "the employee is qualified for the
job," and (3) the reassignment "does not impose an undue burden on the
employer."'69 The ADA, the court reasoned, does not "requir[e] the reassigned
employee to be the best qualified ... for the [position]."' 70 However, the Smith
165. Id.
166. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although
written in the context of an Establishment Clause case, Scalia's comments in Edwards generally
reflect his distaste for relying on legislative intent.
167. Id. at 637-38.
168. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
169. Id. at 1169.
170. Id. Such a conclusion, the court noted, is "judicial gloss unwarranted by the statutory
language or its legislative history." Id. Two other circuit court cases followed the holding in
Smith. In Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc), the D.C.
Circuit held that the ADA's reassignment provision requires something more from an employer
than simply allowing a disabled employee to compete equally with other job applicants for a
vacant position. Id. at 1304. Furthermore, the court found that placing an employee in a vacant
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court distinguished this type of reassignment from one that would conflict with
the neutral employment policies of employers, finding the latter unreasonable
because of the adverse effects on both employers and other nondisabled
employees. 17'
In Barnett, Justice Scalia argued, however, that both reassignments discussed
in Smith would be unreasonable because reassignment does not "envision the
elimination of [workplace] obstacles . .. that have nothing to do with
[employees'] disability."'72 Thus, Justice Souter's universal disapproval of
employer seniority systems seems to inject an aspect of affirmative action into
the workplace, advocating unwarranted preferential treatment for disabled
employees in violation of established seniority rights.'73 Justice Souter's
position over more qualified applicants was not a prohibited preference under the ADA. Id. at
1305. Also, the Tenth Circuit in Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cit. 1999), held that the
no-transfer policy of a municipal employer must give way to the ADA's reassignment
obligation. Id. at 1131-32. The court recognized that "failure to reassign a disabled employee
[may] constitute discrimination, and therefore a basis for liability, under the ADA." Id. at 1132.
In addition, the court rejected the notion that such reassignments were preferential and a form
of affirmative action. Id. at 1137.
171. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1176; see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the importance of
neutral and legitimate employer policies identified by the Smith court).
172. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 416 (2002) (Barnett I1) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Scalia argues that the other possible reasonable accommodations listed under 42
U.S.C. § 12111(9) of the ADA concern either workplace burdens because of an employer's
disability or disability-related obstacles that have the same focus of eliminating obstacles of the
current position. Id. at 415; see Aka, 156 F.3d at 1314-15 (Silberman, J., dissenting)
(interpreting "'reassignment to a vacant position"' consistently with the other accommodations
listed in § 12111(9), none of which "even alludes to the possibility of a preference for the
disabled over the non-disabled"); see also EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024 (7th
Cir. 2000). Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, held that the ADA is not a mandatory
preference act and found the Tenth Circuit's decisions in both Smith and Davoll inconsistent
with the ADA. Id. at 1028. Judge Posner strongly advocated his disagreement with Smith:
There is a difference, one of principle and not merely of cost, between requiring
employers to clear away obstacles to hiring the best applicant for ajob, who might
be a disabled person or a member of some other statutorily protected group, and
requiring employers to hire inferior (albeit minimally qualified) applicants merely
because they are members of such a group. That is affirmative action with a
vengeance. That is giving a job to someone solely on the basis of his status as a
member of a statutorily protected group. It goes well beyond enabling the
disabled applicant to compete in the workplace, or requiring the employer to
rectify a situation (such as lack of wheelchair access) that is of his own doing.
Id. at 1028-29.
173. See Befort & Donesky, supra note 18, at 1074. The authors describe the conflict under
"non-discriminatory transfer and assignment policies" as:
On the one hand, interpreting the ADA as requiring employers to make exceptions
to such policies and to treat disabled employees differently than non-disabled
employees resembles a preference in favor of the disabled and cuts against the
[Vol. 57:225
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss1/10
NOTE
conclusion that U.S Airways should have accommodated Barnett would have
inevitably violated the neutrality of the ADA, which "does not guarantee equal
results, establish quotas, or require preferences favoring individuals with
disabilities over those without disabilities."' 74 Indeed, in Daugherty v. City of
El Paso,75 the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the ADA is not an affirmative
action statute and noted the importance behind the ADA of not requiring
preferences for disabled employees. 176 That court stated,
[W]e do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative action in favor of
individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that disabled
persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over those who
are not disabled. It prohibits employment discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and no less. 177
Moreover, in Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc.,78 the Seventh Circuit
discussed the affirmative-action quality of interpreting the ADA to require
employers to abandon "legitimate, nondiscriminatory company policies." 179 The
Dalton court noted that such an interpretation of the ADA would "convert a
nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference statute, a result which
would be both inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an
unreasonable imposition on the employers and coworkers of disabled
employees."' 18 Thus, whereas the majority opinion in Barnett created an
opportunity for preferential treatment, Justice Souter's dissent called for a
universal disapproval of seniority that undoubtedly violates the seniority rights
of nondisabled employees in an affirmative-action type process. Both
interpretations allow for preferential treatment unwarranted by the ADA.
V. Conclusion
In Barnett, the Supreme Court should simply have ruled that it is always
unreasonable to accommodate disabled employees under the ADA if that
accommodation conflicts with legal and bona fide seniority systems regardless
equal treatment model reflected in most anti-discrimination statutes. On the other
hand, the text, history, and purpose of the ADA suggest that preferential treatment
for the disabled may not only be appropriate, but required.
Id.
174. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. Bkgrd.
175. 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
176. Id. at 700.
177. Id.
178. 141 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1998).
179. Id. at 678.
180. Id. at679.
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of whether employers have unilaterally created and administered their seniority
systems. Instead, the Court created an unclear standard because of its fear that
corrupt employers could use their unilaterally created seniority systems to avoid
accommodating disabled employees. Unfortunately, the Court's creation of a
new balancing inquiry did not follow judicial precedent supporting and
upholding bona fide seniority systems because of their important role within and
the many benefits that they provide for the employment community.
Employers are legally required to provide reasonable accommodations for
their disabled employees. These accommodations effectively assist valuable
disabled employees in fulfilling employment obligations for which they are
qualified. But when a reassignment conflicts with a valid, legitimate, and
nondiscriminatory seniority policy, the accommodation simply becomes
unreasonable. To hold otherwise fails to recognize the significant importance
of employer seniority systems and the seniority rights of nondisabled
employees. The Court erred in not adequately understanding the real conflict
in Barnet and by creating the opportunity for preferential accommodations that
will adversely affect the efficiency, consistency, and policy of future ADA
cases.
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